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EMPIRICISM AND PHILOSOPHIC METHOD
PROFESSOR DEWEY'S VIEWS
BY VICTOR S. YARROS
SOME two or three years ago. in a stimulating volume of essays
on Critical Realism, one of the more polemical contributors V>
the symposium attacked the philosophy of Prof. John Dewey and
pointed »ut that one could not determine whether that eminent Prag-
matist was an idealist or realist. The critic added that Professor
Dewey's apjieal to "experience" was of little significance, since "only
Cod knew what the Pragmatists meant by experience."
It must be admitted that the impartial bystander found consider-
able point or force in those complaints. Professor Dewey had not
up to that time made sufficiently clear what his full definition of
experience was, nor what his neutrality toward the belligerents in
the renewed warfare between neo-idealism and neo-realism implied,
or how it was justified.
In the more elaborate and solid series of lectures on philosophy,
entitled "Experience and Nature," recently given by Professor
Dewey on the Paul Cams Foundation, however, legitimate doubts
are set at rest, questions of acute critics indirectly but satisfactorily
answered, and ambiguities cleared up. Professor Dewey, unfor-
tunately, is at times unnecessarily involved and heavy ; the lighter
touch and the simpler style of his Reconstruction in Philosophy or
his Human Nature and Conduct w^ould have made his new and im-
portant work profitable to thousands of lay students of contempo-
rary thought whom highly technical language may intimidate and
discourage. r>ut the attentive and earnest reader will find the vol-
inne rich, pregnant, deep and well worthy of the intellectual efifort
it requires.
The present writer intends to devote two or three short papers
to Professor Dewey's mature ex])osition of his philosophy and to
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make certain comments upon some of his propositions or conclu-
sions. The first lecture, devoted to the question of method in a phil-
osophy which claims to be rational and scientific, is so fundamental
and so important that it will be treated here as an independent essay.
Professor Dewey is a frank champion of the empirical method.
Not because he finds it to be superior to any other, but because, as
he has little difficulty in showingf, there really is no other method
available to philosophy. Those schools which reject empiricism rea-
son in a vacuum, as it were ; they arrive nowhere and do not even
make a start. The schools which half-heartedly or inconsistently
adopt empiricism become sterile and rhetorical at the precise point
at which empiricism is dropped or ignored.
The empirical method, says Professor Dewey, involves a con-
scious, bold repudiation of two bad traditions in philosophy. In the
first place, the empiricist appeals to universal human experience,
and does not claim "a private access to truth." Indeed, "the final
issue of empirical method," writes Professor Dewey, "is whether
the guide and standard of belief and conduct lies within or without
the shareable situation of life." The mystic has his claims, but he
offers no guide or standard ; he ofifers nothing "shareable," and no
tests can be applied to exclusive "psychical" possessions. The em-
piricist works in the open with the materials supplied by life and by
verifiable facts. He does not turn his back on common sense ; he
seeks to enrich, organize and aid common sense.
In the second place, the empiricist scorns "loaded dice." By this
Professor Dewey means that the empiricist does not beg the ques-
tion, does not frame premises which assume the very thing that is to
be proved ; he does not flout or violate the requirements of logical
procedure : he does not ask you to embark with him on a journey
with a set of alleged ultimates, or alleged irreducible elements, which
condemn the whole discussion to futile word-play.
The empiricist, then, builds upon experience. Rut what does the
term "experience" mean in philosophy? Professor Dewey's answer
is startling enough. He is content to accept the definition of the
average practical man. Why make a mystery of a perfectly plain
and intelligible affair? The trouble with too many philosophers
has been precisely this—that they have indulged in unnecessary mys-
tification and either laboriously solved unreal problems, problems
no one ever encounters in science or in life, or else have oft'ered
purely verbal solutions of very real and disturbing problems. Now.
there is nothing about the term experience that troul)les the reason-
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able la}man. lie knows what .le means by such phrases as business
experience, legal experience, esthetic experience, and he expects you
to know it. Experience means working, trading, dealing with men
and things, suffering, enjoying, reading, thinking, dreaming, waking,
and the like "Experience," in Professor Dew'ey's words, "is politi-
cal, religious, industrial, intellectual, esthetic, mine, yours." It is
not limited to what the Gradgrinds call "hard facts" ; ideas, fancies,
impulses resisted, impulses yielded to, fears felt and overcome, in-
ward struggles, self-reproaches, all these things are as real as houses,
bridges, food to be eaten, clothes to be worn, money to spend or
to save.
The difference between the common sense notion of experience
and that of the scientific, philosophic thinker is a difference of
degree. The narrower the life, the more elementary the education,
the smaller is the cjuantity of one's experience. We all know that
])ersons who study, read, travel, look through telescopes and micro-
scopes, visit museums and institutes and zoological gardens, have
more experience than the uncultured, ignorant, provincial persons
possess. We all know that where the ordinary man sees a round
and smooth table, and asserts rightly that he sees such a table, the
man of science is aware that the same table is neither round nor
smooth. But we have no quarrel with the layman ; the scientist
merely point out that, if you look at the table through certain spec-
tacles, you will realize that it is not really round or smooth And
the layman will be convinced by the demonstration and be grateful
for it. He \vill observe, without knowing that he is pragmatic, that,
to all intents and purposes, and fnnctio)iaIly speaking, the table zi'os
round and smooth, but that indubitably from the viewpoint of sci-
ence, it was deficient in both of those qualities. The man's experience
will have been enlarged.
Professor Dewey insists that philosophy loses nothing and gains
everything by taking experience for its foundation and guidance.
Of course, as he stops to explain, no science, and therefore, no phil-
osophy, can take all experience for its province. Experience is all-
inclusive ; the earth, the sun, the moon, the stars, the planets are
severally parts of our experience. So is the past of our planet and
of organic and other life. Science selects, as art does . each science
deals with a section of the field of experience and seeks to iHumi-
nate it. Philosophy cannot hope to escape the limitations of human
thought or of science, and. therefore, must select, classify, exclude
and interpret. Well, select what; execlude what; interpret what?
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This question is pertinent and even crucial. Professor Dev.ey
does not blink it or underestimate its significance. His answer is
significant and big with consequences. Here it is, in his own words
:
".
. , In some sense, all philosophy is a branch of morals.
"Our constant and inalienable concern is with good and bad,
prosperity and failure, and hence with choice. We are constructed
to think in terms of value, of bearing upon welfare. The ideal of
welfare varies, but the influence in it is pervasive and inescapable.
In a vital, though not the conventional, sense, all men think with
a moral bias and concern, the 'immoral' man as truly as the righteous
man ; wicked and just men being characterized by bents toward dif-
ferent kind of things regarded as good."
Professor Dewey's meaning is clear
—
philosophy seeks to give
men understanding and wisdom in order to enable them to choose
that which is ethically good, lovely and desirable—that which con-
duces to abundant life and to the greatest possible rational happi-
ness. But philosophy does not kno-dr zdiat is good iijheii it sets out
on its quest; it should beware of its bias and refrain from making
"eulogistic predicates" or tacit estimates. It should not use such
terms as "permanence, real essence, totality, order, unity" to de-
scribe the foundations of a given system ; these terms, and other?
like them, are terms of self-praise. The philosopher may have
unity, permanence, order, etc., for his objectives, but he must not
claim them as implicit in his postulates, for in that case he has noth-
ing left to demonstrate and, besides, he naively repudiates the only
rational method of demonstration. The bias in the philosopher's
mind is inevitable but he must be on his guard against it. Profes-
sor Dewey has no use for any "will-to-believe" in philosophy.
But Mr. Dewey has still another answer to the objection thai,
to take all experience for one's province, is to suffer from an em-
barrassment of riches, to lack standards, to lose one's self in a jun-
gle of disconnected facts, perceptions and emotions. This other
answer is somewhat diflScuIt to grasp, though the thought, once
grasped, is clear and sound. It is, briefly, this—that the term expe-
rience as u.'ed by empirical philosophy designates not alone stuft'.
subject-matter, to sum total of things experienced, but also a method.
To think constantly of experience, in the human sense, is to escape
all sorts of snares. Thus it prevents the empirical philosopher from
accepting as primitive, original, simple distinctions that are the result
of reflection, study and experience. It also warns one against the
confusion between characteristics of objects viewed in a certain
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light, or organized in a certain way, and the so-called '•reality" or
essence of the object, no matter what its form or mode of organiza-
tion. Finally, it tells lis that we must begin li'ith things in th-eir be-
nnldering entanglements rather than zvith arbitrary simplifi-cations.
To realize the value of the method of experience is to understand
that there is no such a thing as a "problem of knowledge" in a pecu-
liar sense. Knowledge itself is and must be experienced. r)n this
point. Professor Dewey must be quoted lengthily. He writes:
"A problem of knowledge in general is, to speak brutally, non-
sense. For knowledge itself is one of the things we empirically
have. While skepticism may be in place at any time about any spe-
cific intellectual belief and conclusion, in order to keep us on the
alert, to keep us inquiring and curious, skepticism as to the things
w^hich we have and are is impossible. No one ever frankly engaged
in it. Its pretentiousness is concealed, however, by the failure to
distinguish between objects of knowledge where doubt is legitimate,
since they i-.ve matters of classification and interpretation, of theon-,
and things which are directly had.
"A man may doubt whether he has measles, because measles is
an intellectual term, a classification ; but he caimot doubt what he
empirically has—not, as has so often been asserted, because he has
an immediately certain knowledge of it, but because it is not a mat-
ter of knowledge at all; not an intellectual afifair. not an affair of
tnith or falsity, certitude or doubt, but one of existence."
There must be something, in other words, present in experience,
something that may be recalled later, pointed to in reflection, acted
upon, before there can be subject-matter or objective for knowledge.
A may says to himself or to a friend : "There is something the mat-
ter with me." TTere is the primary and immediate stuff. Some-
thing is given, and it is irreducible. The man may not know what
his ailment is ; he may not know its name, its cause or its course
and proper treatment. Those things science must tell him. if it can.
or philosophy, if it can. Fiut to deny the given something is to com-
mit intellectual suicide.
And here we strike the question Professor Dewey's critics have
asked concerning his position in the old-but-ever-new controversy
between idealism and realism— namely, whether he is a neo-idealist
or a neo-realist. His nnswer is definite and lucid. The empirical
method and the empirical philosophy are realistic, but in the un-
sophisticated sense of that temi. the term of common sense. Says
Professor Dewev:
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"Things are first acted toward, suffered : and it is for the things
themselves, as they are followed up, to tell, by their own traits,
whether they are subjective or objective. . . . Practically, the dis-
tinction dr?wn between subjective and objective, personal and in
personal, is of immense importance, but for theory it falls within a
continuous world of events. . . . Political institutions, the house-
hold arts, technologies, embodied objective events long before sci-
ence and philosophy arose. Political experience deals with barriers,
mountains, rivers, seas, forests and plains. Men fight for these
things ; for them they exercise jurisdiction, fight and rebel. Being
and having, exercising and suffering such things as these exist in
the open and public world."
That "open and public world" is not a dream, and no rational
person really thinks it is. No one certainly is a skeptic for any
purpose other than so-called philosophical, and Professor Dewey
sees no reason or rhyme in isolating philosophy and putting before
it problems that have no real meaning, no relation to behavior, no
possibility of scientific or practical treatment.
Let it be understood, however, that Professor Dewey is not
bound to -rontend that the question whether the world we know is a
reality or an illusion, a fact or an idea, is not a legitimate one for
any set of thinkers to take up and endeavor to solve. What he is
concerned to emphasize and establish is the proposition that the
controversy between the realists and idealists is not a philosophic
controversy. Just as the politician, the moralist, the educator, the
soldier, the engineer, the physician, the artist ignore that contro-
versy and rightly ignore it, so should the scientific and the empirical
philosopher serenely ignore it. His business is with the world in
which we all live, suffer, rejoice, build, destroy, co-operate and
(juarrel. What would the advocate of prison reform, or the strenu-
ous opponent of capital punishment say to the metaphysician or
philosopher who should ridicule his efforts, his sacrifices, his whole
appeal, on the ground that the world was, or might be, nothing but
an illusion, a fancy, an idea in his brain? What would a nation at-
tacked by an enemy say to the philosopher who should urge it to
remain passive and calm on the ground that the enemy, the machine
guns, the bombing planes, the battleships, the poison gas are only
"ideas"?
Well. Professor Dewey maintains that the controversy between
idealism and realism is about as empty, irrelevant and absurd to the
true philosopher as it is to the statesman, ethical leader, reformer.
592 THE 01-KN COURT
lawmaker, or lover of beauty. The issues of philosophy are eiiher
significant and vital, or else they are not issues at all.
One can imagine Professor Dewey saying to the idealists, or to
the sophisticated realists, for that matter: "I might agree with you
as to the ultimate issues, as you are pleased to call them, but pray do
not drag any such issues into the discussion of the methods, objec-
tives and mission of philosophy. As philosophers we take certain
things as given, or for granted, and existence is one of those things.
Experience, not in any occult, peculiar, "subjective" sense, but in
the ordinary sense is another of the given things. We face life as
it is, with its terrible problems. We must help the men and women
to solve those problems. If we cannot offer any help, we are bank-
rupt. If we cannot expect ever to be of use to struggling, groping
humanity, then we are worse than bankrupt, for there is no hope of
future solvency. We had better shut up shop and retire from a
business so flat, unprofitable and futile.
We have summarized and attempted to interpret Professor
Dewey's introductory lecture. His position being clear and his
critics being silent, at least for the moment, we shall next ask what
Professor Dewey has to say in the volume under consideration of
the essential business of philosophy, and of the metes and bounds
of the philosophic province. Here, too, there are objectors and
critics to deal with. The present writer has already shown in a
paper in The Open Court (Oct., 1923) that he does not regard
Professor Dewey's definition and delimitation of philosophy as quite
satisfactory. We must see, however, what light the new and serious
work throws on this initial and pivotal question. Method is indeed
important to science, to art and to philosophy, but method implies
a problem conceived and formulated, a goal or objective.
